Reputational Concern with Endogenous Information Acquisition

摘要: We develop a reputational cheap talk model to characterize the essential activities of an expert: information acquisition and transmission. The decision maker, who has authority take actions, is in lack relevant uncertain about expert's preference. expert, acquires conveys information, may be biased that he favor particular action, or aligned cares maker's payoand concern. Our main insight shows concern have non-monotonic eect on his incentive: better if only moderate. Another describes possible existence experts actually increase social surplus, which diers from Stephen Morris (2001), Ely Valimaki (2003) Ely, Fudenberg Levine (2008) substantially. Regarding delegation, unlike result Aghion Tirole (1997), we show delegation reduce incentive. Finally, our analysis illustrates maker prefers communication whenever informative feasible, opposite Wouter Dessein (2002).