The implications of learning across perceptually and strategically distinct situations

作者: Daniel Cownden , Kimmo Eriksson , Pontus Strimling

DOI: 10.1007/S11229-014-0641-9

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摘要: Game theory is a formal approach to behavior that focuses on the strategic aspect of situations. The game theoretic originates in economics but has been embraced by scholars across disciplines, including many philosophers and biologists. This an important weakness: situation, which its defining quality theory, often not most salient human (or animal) cognition. Evidence from wide range experiments highlights this shortcoming. Previous theoretical empirical work sought address weakness considering learning ensemble multiple games simultaneously. Here we extend framework, incorporating artificial neural networks, allow for investigation interaction between perceptual functional similarity composing larger ensemble. Using conduct population encounters both stag hunts prisoner’s dilemmas, two situations are strategically different may or be perceptually similar.

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