THE DOUBLE NATURE OF CONVENTIONS

作者: Luis M. Miller

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摘要: This paper aims to integrate both economic and sociological notions of conventions in a single analytical framework. To this end, it starts by distinguishing conceptually between behavioral convention, i.e. an arbitrary but stable social regularity, normative principle action prescribing how behave certain type situation. A game theoretical framework represent the interrelation concepts is then introduced. Finally, relation studied experimentally. The main results experiment are: (1) have be commonly known accepted among subjects order work as guides coordinate on conventions; (2) once follow convention they are highly consistent with repeated environment; (3) efficiency concerns focal games paper.

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