摘要: If war results from disagreement about relative strength, then it ends when opponents learn enough each other. Learning occurs information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes. I present a model of simultaneous bargaining fighting where both players can make offers asymmetric exists the distribution power. In Markov perfect sequential equilibrium, making rejecting has informational value that outweighs one provided battlefield. However, states use sources to settle before military victory. The Principle Convergence posits warfare ceases be useful loses its content belief in defeat (victory) not necessary terminate (initiate) hostilities. Thus, standard puzzle international relations seeks account for prewar optimism on sides may relevant.
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