The Japanese Experience With Scarcity: Management of Traditional Common Lands

摘要: One of the first things we all learn in studying environmental problems is that quality a public or collective good and, conversely, degradation bad. For this reason, action by isolated individuals, however well-intentioned, cannot yield overall improvements and prevent degradation. This "public goods" "free-rider" problem has been eloquently described Garrett Hardin's famous essay, "The Tragedy Conunons," carefully analyzed Mancur Olson's The Logic Collective Action.1 In essence, rational individuals acting their own interest absence any mechanism for cooperation will gradually but inexorably withhold contributions to maintenance of, use up more than fair share commonly held assets, eventually threatening very existence those goods. Some sort decision cooperate exercise mutual restraint (what Hardin calls "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon") obviously necessary. Thus are nature political. challenge society figure out how eliminate circumstances which make decisions lead tragedies commons, essentially create greater overlap syncrony between private good. To date, economists have paid most careful attention free-rider problems, characteristics, even devised some potential theoretical solutions.2