Strategic Managerial Compensation Arising From Product Market Competition
作者： Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich , Konstantinos Serfes
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1540629
关键词:
摘要: We develop a model in which, first, firms design compensation schemes for their managers while subject to moral hazard and, second, compete Bertrand or Cournot fashion the product market. derive strategic properties of managerial levels and incentives. show that implications include: greater systematic risk may weaken incentives one firm strengthening those competitor; an increase idiosyncratic causes all its competitors adjust incentives; considerations account rise U.S. CEO pay use
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