Why emotion recognition is not simulational

作者: Ali Yousefi Heris

DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1306038

关键词:

摘要: According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use same neural processes used experiencing that emotion. This paper argues view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine simulational arguments for three basic emotions fear, disgust, and anger argue account relies strongly on narrow sense processing which hardly squares with evidence how, fact, recognition processed. contend current body empirical suggests processed integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions brain, understanding as information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In final section, discuss possible objections.

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