EFFORT, RACE GAPS, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF COLLEGE ADMISSIONS

摘要: I investigate the effect of Affirmative Action in higher education on both study effort choice and college placement outcomes for high school students. model admissions as a Bayesian game where heterogeneous students compete seats at col- leges universities varying prestige. There is an allocation mechanism mapping each student's achieved test score into seat some college. A color-blind ignores race, whereas mechanisms may give preferential treatment to minori- ties variety ways. The particular form determines how students' linked with their payoff, playing key roll shaping behavior. use evaluate ability given admission policy mini- mize racial academic gaps—the achievement gap enrollment gap—and promote overall. also compare alternative policies against one another terms these criteria; namely, admissions, quotas, preferences. These have very different effects effort, gaps, equilibrium. Compared allocations, simple preference such previously used undergraduate admis- sions University Michigan unambiguously detrimental incentives, ineffective helping minorities gain admittance better colleges. Quota performs than Michigan-style preference, positive nega- tive gaps. By design, quota eliminates completely. Both widen among best brightest