A Mechanism Design of Dispute Resolution Systems in a Regional-Free Trade Agreement
作者： Dragan Miljkovic , Miguel Gomez
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摘要: We examine the problem of mechanism design how individual produce firms within NAFTA make their decisions to belong Dispute Resolution Corporation (DRC) when facing a set criteria which they previously agreed upon. dominant strategy (the truth-telling) where both Pareto optimality and optimization DRC’s welfare are achieved. If there pivotal DRC, necessary assumptions made for such work cannot be all satisfied. Next, we compare function current system dispute resolution DRC. Casual empiricism to-date existence DRC suggest firms.
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