Cost Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance.

作者: Joseph E. Johnson , George B. Flanigan , Daniel T. Winkler

DOI: 10.2307/253219

关键词:

摘要: No fault advocates commonly predict automobile insurance cost savings for consumers in states adopting no-faults statutes place of a tort system. For implementing no-fault, the results have been mixed. This study compares loss costs no-fault from 1974 through 1985. Not surprisingly, findings suggest that bodily injury liability were lower on average than after controlling influence wages, population density, and presence comparative negligence. However, total related not significantly states, they higher with compulsory add-on laws to lesser extent high thresholds. Whether lack estimated attributable selection bias or not, causes this result are important issues further research.

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