The Information Content of Specialist Pricing
作者： John P. Gould , Robert E. Verrecchia
DOI: 10.1086/261287
关键词:
摘要: This paper examines a process by which information-revealing prices are determined considering the private incentives of price-setting agent (whom we refer to as specialist). The specialist has information that may be (partially) revealed through his choice pricing rule. We define an equilibrium rule and response representative trader maximizes expected utilities trader, conditional on each having rational expectations. By analyzing existence nature this equilibrium, attempt develop further insights into behavior markets with incomplete information.
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