Naked Exclusion: Comment

摘要: The ability of an incumbent firm to deter entry by writing exclusionary contracts with customers has been a subject contention in the antitrust literature. courts’ concern such challenged those who argue that incumbent, faced buyers whose interest is promote and competition, would have pay more for inclusion provisions than it could possibly gain from exclusion. In provocative article, Eric B. Rasmusen et al. (1991) (henceforth, RRW) argued may fact be able exclude rivals profitably using contractual because can exploit buyers’ lack coordination. essence, if expect other sign provisions, then they see little reason not do so themselves. RRW argument potentially important one most alleged instances deterrence through occur situations multiple buyers. Unfortunately, however, RRW’s two main results contain errors. this Note, we reconsider model, providing correct characterizations likelihood cost exclusion firm. Our indicate while intuition suggested valid, equilibrium differ what derive. Moreover, our analysis illuminates some further aspects contracting Among these issues, focus on how use discriminatory offers externalities exist among provision competition. Section I, review basic assumptions model. Sections II III consider, turn, cases simultaneous sequential studied RRW. For distinguish between settings which cannot discriminate its different (This distinction source problem analysis: their simultaneous-offer model assumes no discrimination, but proof Proposition 2 assumes—at times—that discrimination feasible.) We show absent discriminate, only when fail coordinate preferred continuation equilibrium. contrast, possible, need rely buyer coordination * Segal: Department Economics, Landau Building, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 (e-mail: ilya.segal@stanford.edu); Whinston: Northwestern 2003 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208 mwhinston@nwu.edu). thank Rasmusen, John Wiley, participants Berkeley-Stanford IOfest, University Copenhagen Vertical Restraints Conference, seminar at Antitrust Division U.S. Justice helpful comments. Federico Echenique excellent research assistance. 1 example, recent investigation concerned exclusive leading provider computerized ticketing services, Ticketmaster. Most major cities several large concert/sports venues. many cities, Ticketmaster very share response profitable method given Philippe Aghion Patrick Bolton (1987 I). One factor limiting applicability theory, involves partial exclusion: signed are fully (they involve finite stipulated damages) profitability strategy arises extracting rents entrant occurs. Indeed, offer benefits over contract all. paper, also discuss two-buyer version arise across contrast here RRW, allow make i conditional acceptance decision buyer. 3 R. Innes J. Sexton (1994) context form coalitions entrant.