Do regulators of animal welfare need to develop a theory of psychological well-being?

摘要: The quest for a ``theory of nonhuman minds'' to assessclaims about the moral status animals is misguided. Misframedquestions animal minds facilitate appropriation ofanimal welfare by user industry. When misframed, thesequestions shift burden proof unreasonably animalwelfare regulators. An illustrative instance misframing can befound in US National Research Council's 1998 publication thatreports professional efforts define psychologicalwell-being primates, condition that 1985animal act requires users primates promote. Thereport claims ``psychological well-being'' hypotheticalconstruct whose validity only be determined theory thatdefines its properties and links it observed data. Thisconception used contest common knowledge treating psychological well-being as mentalcondition are difficult discover. Thisframework limits regulatory treat subjects lessoppressively serves interests A more liberatory framework constructed recognizing thecontested nature norms, where competing conceptions have implications norm-setting authority, asit does other contexts, e.g., food safety. Properlyconceptualized should include both avoidance ofdistressful circumstances relationship between ananimal's capacities engage enjoyable activities itsopportunities exercise these capacities. This conception avoids scientific experts. development regulation agood illustration how social norms contested thenappropriated, critique this shows itcan challenged.