Intelligence without representation – Merleau-ponty's critique of mental representation the relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation

作者: Hubert L. Dreyfus

DOI: 10.1023/A:1021351606209

关键词:

摘要: … the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between … in the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A …

参考文章(5)
John McCarthy, HUBERT DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CAN'T DO Artificial Intelligence. ,vol. 80, pp. 143- 150 ,(1996) , 10.1016/0004-3702(95)00086-0
Walter J. Freeman, The Physiology of Perception Scientific American. ,vol. 264, pp. 78- 85 ,(1991) , 10.1038/SCIENTIFICAMERICAN0291-78
Graham MacDonald, E. LePore, R. Van Gulick, John Searle and his critics The Philosophical Quarterly. ,vol. 44, pp. 261- ,(1994) , 10.2307/2219752
Mary Warnock, M. Merleau-Ponty, Colin Smith, Phenomenology of Perception The Philosophical Quarterly. ,vol. 14, pp. 372- ,(1964) , 10.2307/2217780
Hubert Dreyfus, Stuart Dreyfus, Tom, E Athanasiou, Mind Over Machine ,(1986)