Cyber Coercion as a Combined Strategy

摘要: To be understood, cyber strategy and coercion, must be viewed in the additive, combined context. This chapter explores how states integrate cyber operations into larger coercive strategies to compel their rivals. Cyber operations clearly do not occur in isolation, but analysts speak of these events as if they do. The chapter posits an empirical question: Are unique combinations of power more likely to produce concessions? To answer this question, it maps how states combine cyber, diplomatic, economic, and conventional military instruments to compel their rivals. It also examines the utility of achieving concession by target type, focusing on government or nonmilitary targets. The investigation finds that cyber operations have a limited coercive utility. Even when cyber operations are combined with more traditional inducements like economic and military threats, they are unlikely to produce concessions. There is no magic combination of statecraft in rival relationships that tend to be highly coercive.