Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

摘要: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games reputations to make important advances understanding such relationships. Repeated Games Reputations begins with careful development fundamental concepts these theories, including notions game, strategy, equilibrium. Mailath Samuelson then present classic folk theorem reputation results for perfect imperfect public monitoring, benefit modern analytical tools decomposability self-generation. They also more recent developments, beyond theorems work private monitoring alternative approaches reputations. synthesizes unifies vast body this area, bringing reader research frontier. Detailed arguments proofs are given throughout, interwoven examples, discussions how theory is be used study relationships, economic applications. The book will useful those doing basic as well using applied research. Available OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0195300793/toc.html