Owner Control and Firm Performance: A Cross-sectional Study of Swedish Listed Firms with Dual Class of Shares

摘要: This paper employs agency theories and findings in corporate governance to study a special group of listed firms with dual class shares pyramidal structure Sweden. 44 both A B traded on SSE are studied using market data accounting statements. Determinants voting concentration by single equation Tobit model simultaneous equations where control variable performance treated as endogenous. For comparison, two measures used: (1) Shapley-Shubik Power Indices, (2) pure rights the controlling owner. The indicates that growth rate is negatively related concentration. Also, better terms return assets tend have more concentrated structure. However, market-to-book ratio negative significant relation when power owner evaluated at simple majority but not super majority. Higher debt contributes concentration, especially under rule. In system, results show higher lower found model. Most significantly, ratios profits. facilitates degree borrowing does necessarily provide outside/bank monitoring firm financier can collude. discount for serves counter argument existence bank mechanism.