Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts

作者: Daniel P. Miller

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12068

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摘要: This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and design procurement auctions. I estimate effect ex post contract revisions unit costs for both subcontracted in-house performed work items bridge projects procured by California Department Transportation. model a scoring auction showing how skew bidding decisions from bid data using method sieve estimation. The results highlight cost implications contracting frictions, decisions, distortions. In conclusion, propose alternative mechanisms that could improve outcomes.

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