Subject Pools and Deception in Agricultural and Resource Economics Experiments

作者: Timothy N. Cason , Steven Y. Wu

DOI: 10.1007/S10640-018-0289-X

关键词:

摘要: The use of student subjects and deception in experiments are two controversial issues that often raise concerns among editors reviewers, which might prevent quality research from being published agricultural resource economics (ARE) journals. We provide a self-contained methodological discussion these issues. argue field professionals the most appropriate for questions related to policy or measurement, students scientific closely tied economic theory. Active deception, where provided with explicitly misleading information, has been avoided mainstream discipline because it can lead loss experimental control, subject selection bias, impose negative externalities on other researchers. Disciplinary ARE journals may want abide by norms against maintain credibility. Interdisciplinary have more flexibility, although is important guidelines avoid too much reviewer-specific variation standards. For researchers, we suggest employing deception-free design whenever possible know no encouraged.

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