摘要: Models of strategic investment behaviour show that an incumbent firm by making pre-emptive capital investments may restrict the entrant's size and increase its market share, or deter entry limit number firms in industry. The existing empirical literature on testing models offers inconclusive evidence. This paper takes a different approach focuses incentives shows upward downward adjustment costs will be important determinants desirability credibility investments. turn posits link between industry structure as measured concentration firms. While analysis is best viewed suggestive offering alternative to examining behaviour, results, based large sample US manufacturing industries, reveals evidence favour such relationship.
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