Improving Bid Efficiency for Humanitarian Food Aid Procurement

作者: Aniruddha Bagchi , Jomon Aliyas Paul , Michael Maloni

DOI: 10.1016/J.IJPE.2011.07.004

关键词:

摘要: Abstract The competitive bid process used by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to procure food supplies and transportation services for humanitarian aid is subject bidder gaming that can increase prices deter competition. Additionally, suppliers carriers are matched after submission, preventing synergies from coordinated planning. Given these concerns, we determine optimal auction mechanism minimize then justify pre-bid planning between using properties cost distribution functions. We operationalize changes with a uniform price auction. improved should gaming, enhance participation, delivered volumes.

参考文章(21)
Knut Sydsaeter, Peter Berck, Arne Strøm, Economists' Mathematical Manual ,(1991)
J. George Shanthikumar, Moshe Shaked, Stochastic orders and their applications ,(1994)
Christian Gollier, The economics of risk and time ,(2001)
Paul R. Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work ,(2004)
Bill McKelvey, Christine Wycisk, Michael Hülsmann, Designing an electronic auction market for complex 'smart parts' logistics: Options based on LeBaron's computational stock market International Journal of Production Economics. ,vol. 120, pp. 476- 494 ,(2009) , 10.1016/J.IJPE.2009.03.006
G. Perrone, P. Roma, G. Lo Nigro, Designing multi-attribute auctions for engineering services procurement in new product development in the automotive context International Journal of Production Economics. ,vol. 124, pp. 20- 31 ,(2010) , 10.1016/J.IJPE.2009.10.003
Michael H. Rothkopf, Ronald M. Harstad, Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay Management Science. ,vol. 40, pp. 364- 384 ,(1994) , 10.1287/MNSC.40.3.364
Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design Mathematics of Operations Research. ,vol. 6, pp. 58- 73 ,(1981) , 10.1287/MOOR.6.1.58
Chi-fu. Huang, Robert H. Litzenberger, Foundations for financial economics ,(1988)