Demand information sharing in port concession arrangements

摘要: Abstract This paper investigates the effects of demand information sharing on concession arrangements and market equilibria, when two ports, each managed by a welfare-maximizing port authority profit-maximizing operator, compete for demands. The problem is formulated as multi-stage game, in which operator at first decide whether to share make arrangements; then, operators la Cournot. Alternative scenarios are compared identify structure. Our analytical results conditions under beneficial highlight importance underlying structure congestion levels achieving these benefits. Specifically, we show that source welfare improvement, more significant positive externality large, inter-port competition strong, costly. However, with no compensation, have incentive their private because otherwise, this likely increase unit-fees, limit ability effectively other, ultimately reduce expected profits. Therefore, transfer payments necessary encourage sharing. With arrangement assumed symmetric cost service structure, prefers if exceeds threshold. Furthermore, sufficiently both ports benefit from information. Finally, price, operator's single-side may not always its authority.