An alternative to privatization of transition economy state-owned enterprises : the case of China

作者: Liu Wang

DOI:

关键词:

摘要: Recent literature has focused on privatization in addressing the issue of making stateowned enterprises (SOEs) more competitive global marketplace. As a result, number SOEs have been privatized many transition economies. Unfortunately, there not major performance improvements aftermath within these contexts. Therefore, we are interested exploring whether is an incomplete or maybe even erroneous solution to economy competitive. Using China as illustration, this paper analyzes possibility employing contractual incentives alternative strategy conquering SOE inefficiency, and proposes that well-designed incentive system will work effective countermeasure opposed straightforward solving problems

参考文章(44)
Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability The Bell Journal of Economics. ,vol. 10, pp. 74- 91 ,(1979) , 10.2307/3003320
Justin Yifu Lin, Zhou Li, Fang Cai, Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise Reform. The American Economic Review. ,vol. 88, pp. 422- 427 ,(1998)
Paul Robert Milgrom, John Roberts, John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management ,(1992)
Xiao-Yuan Dong, Louis Putterman, China's State-Owned Enterprises in the First Reform Decade: An Analysis of a Declining Monopsony Economics of Planning. ,vol. 35, pp. 109- 139 ,(1997) , 10.1023/A:1020137529522
Gary H Jefferson, China's State Enterprises: Public Goods, Externalities, and Coase The American Economic Review. ,vol. 88, pp. 428- 432 ,(1998)
Krishna G. Palepu, Tarun Khanna, Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets Harvard Business Review. ,vol. 75, pp. 41- 48 ,(1997)
Gregory C. Chow, China's Economic Transformation ,(2002)
David Martimort, Jean-Jacques Laffont, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model ,(2001)