作者: Toshihiro Matsumura , Yoshihiro Tomaru
DOI: 10.1111/CAJE.12022
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摘要: We investigate optimal tax-subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. compare the subsidies resulting welfare levels among four regimes: Cournot duopolies Stackelberg competition public leaderships. show that, contrast to existing works on privatization neutrality theorem, affects welfare. Duopole mixte, privatisation et subsidisation en presence de fardeau fiscal excedentaire. On examine les politiques optimales taxes subventions dans le cas d'oligopoles mixtes prives subsides optimaux effets sur niveau bien-etre quatre regimes : duopoles (mixte prive) la concurrence a avec leadership prive. montre que contrairement ce suggeraient travaux anterieurs theoreme neutralite privatisation, affecte niveaux bien-etre.