Rewards versus intellectual property rights

作者: Steven Shavell , Tanguy van Ypersele

DOI: 10.1086/322811

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摘要: Abstract This paper compares reward systems to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by the government (possibly on basis of sales), pass immediately into public domain. Thus, engender incentives innovate without creating monopoly power rights. But principal difficulty with rewards is information required their determination. We conclude in our model that do not possess fundamental social advantage over an optional system—under which choose between rights—is superior

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