The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The WTO Secretariat and the role of economics in panels and arbitrations

摘要: Introduction The process of resolving disputes under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) involves a complex and evolving legal jurisprudence. One foundational element to WTO contract is that adjudicators – is, panellists arbitrators issue formal rulings might result in changes members' economic policies. This tight link between dispute settlement policy makes it important understand, evaluate, continually refine how analysis used influence legal–judicial critical institutional performance. Consider two representative examples DSU panellists' arbitrators' direct on US–Steel Safeguards which prospect (or realization) arbitration authorized retaliation induced respondent country comply with obligations by reforming adversely affected another member's expected market access benefits. In this dispute, United States responded threat eliminating WTO-inconsistent safeguard thus decreasing US import tariff. A second example EC–Beef Hormones case; even though failed change respondent's induce compliance, established level permissible complainant its policy. case, was an increase And while these are national trade policies, almost every contested government measure affecting markets or incentives, affects some nation's