Market architectures, institutional landscapes and testbed experiments

作者: Charles R. Plott

DOI: 10.1007/BF01211116

关键词:

摘要: Designer markets are becoming a reality. A merger of theory and experimental work is setting stages for different kind economics. The modern of mechanisms suggests that it possible to design and/or decentralized mechanisms can perform tasks were thought be impossible. The mechanisms themselves become active participants with computers solving complex optimization or coordination problems based on "messages" submitted to the system by decentralized agents. Competition becomes utilized in new ways in the context what known as "smart markets." Testbed experiments are demonstrating such processes developed beyond purely theoretical discussions. Paper processes, mechanisms found only ideas the pages a journal, being transformed operating physical presence that studied modified practical considerations. Policy research has expanded incorporate ideas; traces theorizing be found institutions put into place. five papers contained in this issue represent approach economic research.

参考文章(1)
Paul J. Brewer, Charles R. Plott, A BINARY CONFLICT ASCENDING PRICE (BICAP) MECHANISM FOR THE DECENTRALIZED ALLOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO USE RAILROAD TRACKS. International Journal of Industrial Organization. ,vol. 14, pp. 857- 886 ,(1996) , 10.1016/0167-7187(96)01014-4