On managerial contracting with asymmetric information

作者: Joan E. Ricart I Costa

DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(89)90071-8

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摘要: Abstract This paper deals with asymmetric information in a two-period principal-agent model where the agent makes investment decisions after observing private signal. We study case current employer has more than other prospect employers and is not verifiable by employer. analyze effect of these asymmetries on wage contracts as well their interplay.

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