General Equilibrium Tax Incidence under Imperfect Competition: A Quantity-setting Supergame Analysis

作者: Carl Davidson , Lawrence W. Martin

DOI: 10.1086/261356

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摘要: The incidence of various taxes is analyzed in a model with competitive and oligopolistic sectors. Friedman's "grim" trigger strategies support collusion firms producing output to maximize joint profits subject the constraint that no firm desires cheat. sustainable level depends on capitalized value future retaliation; therefore, tax-induced changes net return capital (the discount rate) affect mix through their impact sustainability collusion. This "collusive pricing effect" isolated analyzed. One result general factor tax (but not labor) shifted.

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