PP-VCA: A Privacy-Preserving and Verifiable Combinatorial Auction Mechanism

摘要: Combinatorial auctions can be employed in the fields such as spectrum auction, network routing, railroad segment, and energy which allow multiple goods to sold simultaneously any combination of bid maximum sum combinations bidding prices calculated. However, traditional combinatorial auction mechanisms, data concerning bidders’ price bundle might reveal sensitive information, personal preference competitive relation since winner determination problem needs resolved terms above. In order solve this issue, paper exploits a privacy-preserving verifiable protocol (PP-VCA) protect privacy ensure correct secure manner, we design one-way monotonically increasing function bidder’s enable auctioneer pick out largest without revealing information about bids. Moreover, employ three subprotocols, namely, protocol, scalar payment implement with bidder verifiability. The results comprehensive experimental evaluations indicate that our proposed scheme provides better efficiency flexibility meet different types volume number bidders.