The Evolutionary Stability of Bluffing in a Class of Extensive Form Games

摘要: It is common in many different organisms for contests to be settled through the use of agonistic displays rather than physical fights. For example, where males compete females, Red deer will settle contest based on roaring tempo (Clutton-Brock and Albon 1979), toads pitch a croak (Davies Halliday 1978) African buffalo ritualized head-on charges (Sinclair 1977). The traditional view communication encounters suggests that should contain information about who would win an escalated (i.e. Cullen 1972; Parker 1974). Exchanging this benefical both individuals, as they could without high cost fight. recent concept exploitive (Krebs Dawkins 1984) continuing application game theory aggressive (Maynard Smith 1976; Bishop Cannings 1978; Maynard 1982; Enquist 1985), have stirred interest possiblity bluffing one individual gives false order nonescalated contest). (1982) reasoned if did not cost, it invade, rendering signal uninformative eventually ignored by opponents. Along same lines reasoning, has been argued display affects outcome cont st transmit resource holding power (RHP) intention 1974; Zahavi 1977, 1979). A correlated RHP more costly bluff therefore reliable compared intention. general predictions, therefore, hay part stable strategy.