Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions
作者： ANUP AGRAWAL , GERSHON N. MANDELKER
DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-6261.1987.TB03914.X
关键词:
摘要: … prior to an investment announcement. This procedure is adopted because we are interested in valuing managers' stockholdings at the time they make the investment decision. The …
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