Evolutionary-stable strategies with increasing and decreasing marginal utilities in the Ausubel auction
作者： A. Mochon , D. Quintana , Y. Saez , P. Isasi
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摘要: A genetic algorithm has been developed to solve bidding strategies in a dynamic multi-unit auction: the Ausubel auction, with independent private values and without dropout information. The aims maximize each bidder’s payoff. To this end two experimental environments have tested decreasing increasing marginal utilities. are analyzed, along their effects on revenue efficiency. With utilities computational experiments yield sincere as evolutionary-stable strategy, which is also weakly dominant strategy ex post perfect equilibrium. Nevertheless, there no theory model order find Therefore, challenge of work study auction outcome where theoretical predictions unknown. finds sincerely
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