Rent-seeking as Process

作者: Mushtaq H. Khan

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139085052.003

关键词:

摘要: So far in our analysis of rents, we have looked only at the implications rents themselves and not processes through which are created or maintained. In fact, since are, by definition, beneficial for recipients, they likely to spend resources create, maintain transfer particular rents. Rent-seeking is expenditure effort creating, maintaining transferring . These expenditures can be legal, as with most forms lobbying, queuing, contributions political parties. But also illegal, case bribes, illegal contributions, on private mafias, so on. The tremendous significance because use up a social cost, determine types maintained society. Conventional rent-seeking theory, however, assumes that results creation protection monopoly and, addition, it makes restrictive assumptions about how cost determined. Nevertheless, contribution this theory was tell us an additional monopoly. However, conventional framework has radically extended if relevant real world. Institutional economics economy both suggest directions extended.

参考文章(0)