Moral Development Theory: A Critique of Its Kantian Presuppositions

摘要: Abstract Contemporary moral development theory follows pathways laid down in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). For Kant, action consists dutiful adherence to formal rules and has nothing do with pursuit personal goals. Indeed, one can be sure that one's is only if it done out duty goes against all “inclinations.” Some contemporary developmentalists (for instance, Kohlberg Turiel) areformalists:they draw from conception as universalizable categorical imperatives, recognizable by their features, pertain social issues. Others (e.g., Eisenberg) arealtruists:they on Kant's insistence inherently self-sacrificial, though they also insist acts specifically motivated desire benefit others. We subject both formalism altruism thorough critique. Both positions define domain too narrowly, leaving questions private morality like being honest oneself; cannot accommodate other principled conceptions morality, eudaimonism, reject Kantian presuppositions; answer question “Why moral?” Whether impersonal or anti-personal, neglect personal. propose a character-based redefinition reintegrates self values, taking advantage insights into these areas afforded interactivist framework. conclude describing challenges truly adequate account will have meet contributions eudaimonism make meeting those challenges.