Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules

作者: Mika Widgrén

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614385.011

关键词:

摘要: This paper examines different ways of measuring power and the use these measures in context European Union. The deals with classical indices co-operative games more recent non-cooperative a priori measures. Special emphasis is inter-institutional balance power, Nice reforms eastern enlargement.

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