Bilevel formulation of a policy design problem considering multiple objectives and incomplete preferences

作者: Bryant Hawthorne , Jitesh H. Panchal

DOI: 10.1080/0305215X.2013.819093

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摘要: A bilevel optimization formulation of policy design problems considering multiple objectives and incomplete preferences the stakeholders is presented. The presented for Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) decentralized energy infrastructure. upper-level problem designer's lower-level a Nash equilibrium resulting from market interactions. designer has two objectives: maximizing quantity generated minimizing cost. decide on quantities while net present value capital investment. in presence formulated as stochastic linear complementarity solved using expected formulation, residual minimization Monte Carlo technique. primary contributions this article are mathematical FIT policy, extension computational de...

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