Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories:
作者： Mark Bergen , Shantanu Dutta , Orville C. Walker
DOI: 10.1177/002224299205600301
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摘要: Agency and related theories have proven useful as theoretical frameworks for examining relationships between principals their agents in many disciplines. However, though marketing involves a wi...
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(83)
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