Understanding as Knowledge of Causes

作者: Stephen R. Grimm

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_19

关键词:

摘要: What happens when we move from knowing that something is the case to understanding why it case: e.g., eclipse occurred occurred? According a long line of philosophers, not result acquiring some sort superknowledge but rather simply more knowledge: in particular, said, knowledge causes. Although this traditional view understanding, several recent philosophers have argued can no longer be sustained. Duncan Pritchard, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Catherine Elgin, for example, causes either necessary or sufficient, both. In paper I consider objections been made view, argue what they show mistaken, needs understood particular way. More specifically, primary object proposition set propositions, actual causal relationships (or, broadly, modal relationships) obtain world.

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