Belief and the Will

作者: C. van Fraassen

DOI: 10.2307/2026388

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摘要: Can we rationally come to believe a proposition that is entailed neither by those have believed heretofore nor our previous opinions conjoined the evidence before us? Discussing this question, William James quoted W. K. Clifford's statement (in “Ethics of Belief”) it wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone anything on insufficient evidence. Arguing against this, claimed that, in forming beliefs, pursue two aims: truth avoid error, argued extent which either at cost other matter choice: “he who says ‘Better go without belief forever than lie!’ merely shows his own preponderant private horror becoming dupe. He may be critical many desires fears, but fear he slavishly obeys …a certain lightness heart seems healthier excessive nervousness [about error]. At any rate, fittest thing empiricist philosopher.” In philosophy science, until recently, something sort was regarded as part received view: general theories, such Darwin's, Einstein's, or Bohr's, cannot established basis evidence, they are true. addition, what take itself not indubitable, later regard having been false.

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