Side Channel Information Set Decoding Using Iterative Chunking

摘要: This paper presents an attack based on side-channel information and (ISD) the code-based Niederreiter cryptosystem evaluation of practicality using electromagnetic side channel. We start by directly adapting timing plaintext-recovery Shoufan et al. from 2010 to constant-time implementation as used in official FPGA-implementation NIST finalist “Classic McEliece”. then enhance our ISD a new technique that we call iterative chunking further significantly reduce number required measurements. theoretically show improvements have significant impact reducing For example, for 256-bit security parameter set kem/mceliece6960119 McEliece”, improve basic requires 5415 measurements less than 562 average mount successful attack. Further reductions can be achieved at price increasing cost computations. confirm findings practically mounting McEliece” all proposed sets.