Delegation of Specification: An Agency Theory of Organizations

摘要: To date, much of the literature on institutional economics has relied abstract metaphors based in exchange. Thus, Williamson introduced fundamental insights surrounding his “transaction costs” model and discussed governance contracts exchange relationships. Yet organizations are horizontal systems only metaphor; we also need to understand how vertical agency is directed -- it that people arrive with skills learn what they know make enterprise successful. The distribution higher-level decision patterns or residual claims do not fully explain processes specification organizational members actually do. This paper rejects view common an organization should be seen as a "nexus contracts." It develops explicit theory delegation which economizing principals prefer hire imperfect agents members, allowing (and manipulating) third-party mechanisms perfect correct for agent shortcomings. In this way, collective emergent features settings joined dyadic concerns. A number propositions follow. logic allows us link literatures now treated disjunct. Organizations created exist efficient means directing correcting) behavior agents. tell