摘要: Abstract The traditional Arrowian framework assumes that the aggregation rule maps n -tuples of exact individual preferences into an social relation. In this paper, both and are permitted to be fuzzy . Under a relatively strong transitivity condition, counterparts Arrow's conditions result in oligarchic not dictatorial rules. disctatorship is restored if these supplemented by Positive Responsiveness. weaker impossibilities disappear. However, relation constrained generate choice, new may emerge.
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