Optimal franchise contracts with private cost information
作者： Bernd Hempelmann
DOI: 10.1016/J.IJINDORG.2005.07.008
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摘要: Abstract This paper considers franchise arrangements in the case where franchisee has private information about marginal cost of sale. It is shown that optimal contract general leads to different margins for parties than with common information. However, special cases same are optimal.
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