Essays on the Economics of Contracts and Organizations

摘要: This thesis consists of three essays on the economics contracts and organizations. The first essay studies organizational design as allocation decision rights, primarily focusing its interplay with agents’ career motives. It identifies a new tradeoff between delegation centralization, which arises solely from concerns: When delegated, an agent takes inefficient actions at cost principal but also works harder ex post to implement his project, in order manipulate market expectations ability. Compared existing literature, contribution this study is two-fold. First, it endogenizes agent’s bias result concerns. Second, perhaps more importantly, uncovers link implementation decision. Both these features are sharp contrast vast majority studies, given abstracts away stage process. Specifically, can be strictly optimal present framework even if has no information advantage over principal. Motivated by some entry-level labor markets, second incentive-contracting problem where (i) learns ability before himself, (ii) both productivity well outside option depends I characterize iii for principal, defined most profitable equilibrium outcomes among those satisfying D1 criterion; pooling earlier date sufficiently sensitive principal’s private information, whereas separation later (weakly) otherwise. Further, profit shown neither continuous nor monotone respect option. third stable (one-sided) strategy-proof matching rules many-to-one markets contracts. number such one. doctor-optimal rule, whenever exists, unique candidate rule. Notably, results established without any substitutes conditions hospitals’ choice functions, hence, proofs do not rely “rural hospital” theorem. Finally, when second-best doctor welfare, sense that individually-rational rule dominate it.