Stock option plans for non-executive employees
作者： John E Core , Wayne R Guay
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00062-9
关键词:
摘要: We examine determinants of non-executive employee stock option holdings, grants, and exercises for 756 firms during 1994–1997. We find that firms use greater stock option compensation when facing capital requirements and financing constraints. Our results are also consistent with firms using options to attract and retain certain types of employees as well as to create incentives to increase firm value. After controlling for economic determinants and stock returns, option exercises are greater (less) when the firm's stock …
elsevier.com
sci-hub.se 参考文章(34)
Steven R. Matsunaga, The effects of financial reporting costs on the use of employee stock options Accounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association. ,vol. 70, pp. 1- 26 ,(1995)
John E. Core, Jun Qian, Option-like Contracts For Innovation and Production Social Science Research Network. ,(2000) , 10.2139/SSRN.207968
Robert C. Merton, Theory of rational option pricing ,(2011)
A. Scott Keating, Determinants of divisional performance evaluation practices Journal of Accounting and Economics. ,vol. 24, pp. 243- 273 ,(1997) , 10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00008-1
Clifford W. Smith, Ross L. Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans Australian Journal of Management. ,vol. 7, pp. 139- 157 ,(1982) , 10.1177/031289628200700204
Patricia M. Dechow, Amy P. Hutton, Richard G. Sloan, Economic Consequences of Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation Journal of Accounting Research. ,vol. 34, pp. 1- 20 ,(1996) , 10.2307/2491422
Harold Demsetz, Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences Journal of Political Economy. ,vol. 93, pp. 1155- 1177 ,(1985) , 10.1086/261354
Clifford W. Smith, Ross L. Watts, The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies☆ Journal of Financial Economics. ,vol. 32, pp. 263- 292 ,(1992) , 10.1016/0304-405X(92)90029-W
John R. Graham, Proxies for the corporate marginal tax rate Journal of Financial Economics. ,vol. 42, pp. 187- 221 ,(1996) , 10.1016/0304-405X(96)00879-3
Joseph G. Haubrich, Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem Journal of Political Economy. ,vol. 102, pp. 258- 276 ,(1994) , 10.1086/261931