On Being a ‘We’: Edith Stein’s Contribution to the Intentionalism Debate

摘要: It is commonplace to speak of social groups as if they were capable the same sorts activities individuals. We say, “Germany won World Cup”; “The United States invaded Iraq”; and world mourned passing Nelson Mandela”. In so doing, we attribute agency, belief, emotional states themselves. recent years, much literature devoted analyzing such statements their implications has emerged. Within this literature, issue “intentionalism,” whether individuals must have a certain self-conception in order constitute collectivity, received surprisingly little attention. While Paul Sheehy criticized view, claiming that may be related way collective without realizing it (Sheehy J Soc Philos 33(3):377–394, 2002), other scholarship on topic exists. The purpose article contribute debate. I will argue, drawing Edith Stein’s phenomenology groups, intentionalism, Margaret Gilbert defines it, false. begin by establishing Gilbert’s account, Sheehy’s criticism what take its shortcomings. then explicate collectives argue plural subjects who do not meet intentionalist requirements can exist. Given this, intentionalism rejected. Because debate presupposes there are irreducibly agents, for claim.