Evolutionary game theory and criticality

摘要: We study a regular two-dimensional network of individuals playing the Prisonner's Dilemma game with their neighbors, assigning to each individual the adoption of two different criteria to make a choice between cooperation and defection. For a fraction q< 1 of her time the individual makes her choice by imitating those done by the nearest neighbors, with no payoff consideration. For a fraction the choice between cooperation and defection of an individual depends on the payoff difference between the most successful neighbor and her payoff. When q= 1 for a special value of the imitation strength K, denoted as K c, the model of social pressure generates criticality. When q= 0 a large incentive to cheat yields the extinction of cooperation and a modest one leads to the survival of cooperation. We show that for the adoption of a very small value of epsilon exerts a bias in favor of either cooperation or defection …