WHEN THE MOUSE SQUEAKS WILL THE ELEPHANT LISTEN? THE EFFECT OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDER VOICE ON CEO DISMISSALS IN GERMAN FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY FIRMS

摘要: We examine the effect of minority shareholder voting dissent on CEO dismissals in listed German family and non-family firms. In spite of the prevailing agency theoretical literature documenting that the interests of controlling families often conflict with those of minority shareholders, we find that minority shareholder voice increases the chance of CEO dismissals, and that high and low levels of family ownership, and having a family member chairing the supervisory board, strengthen this relationship. Our findings not only contribute to the emerging literature on how expressive minority shareholder dissent voting may influence leadership and governance changes in firms, but also to the literature on the corporate governance of family-controlled firms and the emerging stewardship theory of family ownership more specifically.* This paper is work in progress. We gratefully acknowledge valuable feedback on earlier versions of this study from Ruth Aguilera, Amy Hillman, Pursey Heugens, Taco Reus, and various other participants of the 2018 SMS meeting in Paris and the 2019 special SMS conference on strategic leadership in Las Vegas, where we presented earlier versions of this manuscript. Please do not quote or paraphrase without consulting the authors first. Thank you!