作者: Stefan Partelow , Achim Schlüter , Aisa O Manlosa , Ben Nagel , Adiska Octa Paramita
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摘要: Knowledge of the shared resources—or commons—that aquaculture systems rely on, and the appropriate rule and norm systems to govern them—or institutions—is far behind other natural resource use sectors. In this article, we provide a conceptual framework for identifying the social and environmental commons creating collective action problems for aquaculture governance. Collective action problems, or social dilemmas, create problems for governing shared resources because the typical strategies for individual use (maximisation; free riding) are often divergent from broader group interests (e.g. fair contributions; sustainable use). This framework helps identify two types of collective action problems in aquaculture: first‐order (direct use and provision of commons) and second‐order (provision, maintenance and adaptation of institutions to govern commons). First‐order aquaculture commons with governance …